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JURTSPK n , 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
§78-2a-3(2)(j), by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court s 
on; appeal pursuant to Utah Code §78-2-2(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSU ES 
Issue INo. 1 - MIIIpitn>ci' Dismissal ol the Bad-Faith 'Refusal to Settle Counterclaim 
Did Judge Pullan improperly dismiss Burdene Shores' counterclaim against 
Liberty Mutual for bad faith refusal to Settu - lU^tu^ : an oDiigaih .. .-,/; ;;;
 r ) o d 
f u l l i I ili ill il ill II ' mi I II in M i i i il  11 s i mi in I ': i "' % -::M liteuiance policy issued 
to the Shores (hereinafter the "insurance policy")? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Phone Directories v. Henderson, >, 5 
(I! ii .1 2 : ::: : ; ' - ' : ' . ' - '"-: ' ; ' • • • ' ' . • • ' 
Issue No. 2 - Improper Dismissal of Counterclaims for Declaratory Relief 
I ' M lu. l j ' i 1 11111111 111111 • ii|n i i 1 I i ' i iui ' is H i i i i l n i i 1 S I M I V S 1 iiiii.l I "in i Mi I I '.' Mil. 
Shores) claims for declaratory relief by finding as a matter of law, that the Shores' claims 
that the family exclusion (or step down, hereinafter the "family exclusion") provision, 
1 •' ' • ] " u? 
Was it proper foi Judge Pullan to ignore the reasonable expectations of the Shores, based 
on the false representations of the Liberty Mutual agent? Is the family exclusion I 
ami aij'tiiiiiiir'il I 11«111 pu l i l i i |i i ml in " ' • 
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Standard of Review: Correctness. Phone Directories v. Henderson^ 200 UT, 8 
P.3d 256 (Utah 2000). 
Tssue No. 3 - Improper Granting of Summary Judgment Finding the Liberty Mutual 
Family Exclusion Provision Valid and Enforceable 
Did Judge Pullan improperly grant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company's motion 
for summary judgment on their Declaratory Judgment action finding as a matter of law, 
without allowing appropriate discovery or inquiry into related facts, that the family 
exclusion was valid and enforceable against the Shores? 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Sittner v. Schriever. 22 P.3d 784, 2001 UT 
App 99 (Utah App 2001). Speros v. Fricke. 98 P.3d 28, 2004 UT 69, ^20 (Utah 2004). 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, . . . and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Issue No. 4 - Improper Denial of Discovery 
Did Judge Pullan improperly deny the appellant's Rule 56(f) motion to allow 
further discoveiy on issues related to Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment and 
motions to dismiss; and, was the trial court's failure and refusal to require Libeity Mutual 
to go forward with discovery proper? 
Standard of Review: either abuse of discretion or correctness, Roimdy v. Staley^ 
984 P.2d 404 1999 UT 229 (Utah App 1999). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Burdene Shores and Unior Shores (the Shores) are aged, retired persons in their 
70's and 80's. 
The Shores purchased an automobile insurance policy from Liberty Mutual as a 
result of advertising targeted at retired military personnel. The Shores are co-insureds 
under the insurance policy. 
This case involves a simple automobile accident in which Burdene Shores was 
severely injured. Burdene Shores was a passenger in an automobile driven by her 
husband, Unior Shores. Unior Shores was primarily at fault in the accident. 
The accident caused permanent disability to Burdene Shores; and, she incurred 
direct medical and medical related expenses significantly in excess of $25,000. 
As the PIP insurer for Burdene Shores, Liberty Mutual received copies of all direct 
medical expenses and most other medical-related expenses. 
At the time of the accident, the Shores had in force a policy of insurance from 
Liberty Mutual (hereinafter the "insurance policy") with declared policy limits for 
liability of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. The Shores should have been 
adequately insured, including coverage at least sufficient to cover Burdene Shores' 
medical and medical-related expenses for her injuries in the accident. 
Buried within the insurance policy is a conflicting, ambiguous, family exclusion 
provision which Libeity Mutual claims limits its liability to Burdene Shores under the 
liability provisions of the insurance policy to $25,000 for the negligence of Unior 
3 
Shores. 
The insurance policy was delivered to the Shores some time after the policy was 
purchased and coverage was bound. 
The family exclusion and consequent reduced limits of liability for insureds is not 
stated or otherwise mentioned in the policy declarations. No information (materials or 
otherwise) provided by Liberty Mutual to the Shores prior to the Shores' receipt of the 
insurance policy referred to the family exclusion. The family exclusion was never 
pointed out to the Shores by Liberty Mutual in any fashion other than the delivery of a 
46-page insurance policy to the Shores some time after the insurance coverage was 
purchased and after the insurance coverage was bound. The family exclusion was never 
meaningfully disclosed to the Shores until after a liability policy limits claim of $100,000 
was made by Burdene Shores. 
Liberty Mutual has not disputed that it is obligated to pay $25,000 to Burdene 
Shores under the liability provisions of the policy for Unior Shores' negligence. 
However, Liberty Mutual has failed and refused and continues to refuse to pay the 
$25,000 to Burdene Shores as a partial settlement, even though it was demanded. 
Liberty Mutual, as a part of continuing to pressure Burdene Shores to drop all other 
claims, paid the $25,000 into the court at the time they filed the declaratory judgment 
action underlying this appeal. 
Liberty Mutual has failed and refused to make any payments under the liability 
portion of the policy unless and until Burdene Shores provides a complete release of all 
claims against Liberty Mutual. 
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Liberty Mutual asserts, and Judge Pullan found as a matter of law, that Burdene 
Shores is only entitled to recover the family exclusion liability limits amount hidden in 
the insurance policy. 
Course of the Proceedings 
The course of proceedings in the trial court is as follows: 
1. Liberty Mutual filed suit for declaratory judgment against Burdene Shores on 
February 9, 2004, seeking to limit their liability for damages to Burdene Shores to 
$25,000 as a result of the negligence of tJnior Shores. 
2. On February 13, 2004 the trial court, on Liberty Mutual's ex parte request, ordered 
the deposit of $25,000 into the court trust fund by Liberty Mutual, to be held pending the 
outcome of this litigation. 
3. On February 26, 2004, pursuant to request of Liberty Mutual, Burdene Shores, as 
the only defendant, waived service of the summons and complaint. 
4. On March 12, 2004 (filed on March 17, 2004), Liberty Mutual filed an amended 
complaint adding Unior Shores as a defendant in their declaratory judgement action. 
5. On March 25, 2004, Burdene Shores served and filed her answer and 
counterclaims against Liberty Mutual. 
6. On May 25, 2004, Burdene Shores moved for a scheduling and management 
conference because of Liberty Mutual's failure and refusal to begin discovery or hold a 
scheduling and management conference as required by Rule 26(f) of the U R C P . 
7. On May 28, 2004, Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss Burdene Shores' bad 
faith counterclaim (Count Two of her Counterclaim). 
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8. On June 22, 2004, Judge Lynn Davis, at the request of Liberty Mutual and over 
the objection of the defendants, stayed all discovery until August 9, 2004. 
9. On August 9, 2004, oral argument was held on Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss 
Burdene Shores' bad faith counterclaim before Judge Derek Pullan. At the hearing, and 
on August 27, 2004, by written judgment, Judge Pullan dismissed the bad faith 
counterclaim of Burdene Shores. 
10. At the August 9, 2004 hearing, Judge Pullan did not enter a discovery or 
scheduling order as requested by the Shores, but did order that the parties confer to work 
out the outstanding discoveiy issues. 
11. On September 16, 2005 Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment on 
its declaratory judgment claims in its complaint; and, for dismissal of the declaratory 
judgment claims of Burdene Shores' counterclaim. 
12. On October 4, 2004, Burdene Shores served requests for admission and requests 
for production of documents upon Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual responded to the 
requests for admission but failed and refused to respond appropriately to the requests for 
production. 
13. On December 10, 2004 Unior Shores filed and served a motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
14. On December 10, 2004 oral arguments were held on Liberty Mutual's Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment; and, some arguments were had on Unior Shores' Motion for 
Summaiy Judgment. 
15. At the December 10, 2004 hearing, the Shores requested that the court defer its 
6 
decision and allow completion of and additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the 
U R C P . 
16. Judge Pullan denied the request to complete and obtain additional discovery; and, 
ruled in favor of Liberty Mutual on the Motion for Summary Judgment and motion to 
dismiss. The formal judgment was signed January 24, 2005 granting Liberty Mutual's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissing all counterclaims. 
Disposition at the Trial Court 
The trial court failed and refused to enforce the Shores' discovery rights. 
Judge Pullan dismissed Burdene Shores' bad faith counterclaim. 
Judge Pullan granted Liberty Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liberty 
Mutual's claims for declaratory relief; and dismissed the Shores' counterclaims for 
declaratory relief against Liberty Mutual on the same issue - the validity of the family 
exclusion reduced liability limits in Liberty Mutual's insurance policy with the Shores. 
With no evidence and essentially no discovery, Judge Pullan ruled as a matter of law that 
the family exclusion in Liberty Mutual's insurance policy was valid and enforceable. 
Judge Pullan refused to defer summary judgment until after further discovery. He 
refused to require Liberty Mutual to go forward with discovery at the time it should 
initially have gone forward; and, then refused to defer summary judgment to allow 
discovery long after the discovery should have occurred and been properly responded to 
by Liberty Mutual. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
A review of the transcripts of the hearings which are at issue in this case reveal a 
number of transcription errors. Most of those errors relate to the improper identification 
of the person speaking. It is hoped that these transcription errors will have no impact on 
this appeal. 
The transcripts contain only arguments, no testimony and no evidence. 
Background Facts 
1. The Shores are an elderly, retired couple. Burdene Shores was bom on June 17, 
1929, making her 76 years old at this time. Unior Shores was born on November 1, 1921, 
making him 83 years old at this time. Affidavit of Burdene Shores in Opposition to 
Liberty Mutual's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Affidavit of Burdene 
Shores"), para. 3 and 5. Record on Appeal (hereinafter RoA), pgs. 367 and 368. 
2. Unior Shores is retired from the Army. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 3 and 
5. RoA, pgs. 368 and 367. 
Facts about the Case 
3. In late 2002, the Shores received direct mail solicitations from Liberty Mutual 
advertising the availability of preferred rates of insurance for retired military personnel. 
After receiving several of these solicitations and seeing other advertisements from Liberty 
Mutual for automobile insurance they invited a local insurance agent of Liberty Mutual to 
make a presentation to them. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 3 and 5. RoA, pgs. 368 
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and 367. 
4. Burdene Shores and her husband Unior Shores purchased an automobile insurance 
policy from Liberty Mutual on about January 10, 2003. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 
3 and 5. RoA, pgs. 368 and 367 
5. The Shores physically received the insurance policy from Liberty Mutual sometime 
after January 16, 2003. Answer and Counterclaim, Exhibit "A", Cover letter . RoA, pg. 66. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One,.para. 9, RoA, pg. 78. 
6. The purchase occurred as a result of advertising directed at retired military persons 
by Liberty Mutual. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 8 and 9. RoA, page 367. 
7. There were no terms of the insurance policy discussed by Liberty Mutual agents, or 
otherwise disclosed to the Shores prior to the purchase of the insurance policy, except that 
the Shores required the same coverage (including limits of liability) they had under their 
then existing Met Life policy. Affidavit of Burdene Shores, para. 9 through 17. RoA, pgs. 
368 and 367. 
8. In order to close the sale, the Liberty Mutual salesman assured the Shores they 
would have the same coverage under the Liberty Mutual insurance policy as the Met Life 
policy for which the Liberty Mutual salesman was selling a replacement policy. Affidavit 
of Burdene Shores, para. 10 through 16, RoA, pgs. 367 and 366 
9. On September 9, 2003 the Shores were involved in an automobile accident in which 
Unior Shores was driving a vehicle owned by the Shores which was then insured by Liberty 
Mutual. Amended Complaint, para. 6 and 7. RoA, page 17. Answer and Counterclaim, 
Counterclaim, Count One, para. 15, RoA, pg. 77. 
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10. Unior Shores was primarily at fault in causing the accident. Answer and 
Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 16, RoA, pg. 77. 
11. Burdene Shores was a passenger in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and was 
without fault in the accident. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 
15, RoA, pg. 77. 
12. Burdene Shores incurred severe and substantial medical and medical-related 
expenses as a result of the accident. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, 
para. 17, RoA, pg. 77. 
13. Those medical and medical related expenses are substantially in excess of $25,000. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 18, RoA, pg. 77. 
14. As a result of the accident, Burdene Shores is now severely and permanently 
disabled. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 17, RoA, pg. 77. 
15. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy as delivered to the Shores is 46 pages long. 
Answer and Counterclaim, Exhibit "A", RoA, pgs. 66 through 21. 
16. Except for the limits of coverage purchased and rates charged for that coverage 
there was no discussion nor disclosure of the terms of the insurance policy to the Shores 
prior to the issuance of the insurance policy. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, 
Count One, para. 14, RoA, pg. 77. 
17. The Shores had no input into the drafting or terms of the insurance policy. Answer 
and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 13, RoA, pg. 77. 
18. Other than the above, the family exclusion liability limits of the Liberty Mutual 
insurance policy were never disclosed in any meaningful fashion to the Shores until after 
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the insurance policy was purchased by, issued to, and delivered to the Shores; and, a claim 
had been made by Burdene Shores. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, 
para. 19, RoA, pg. 77. 
19. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy is a contract of adhesion. 
20. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy contains declarations listing various types of 
coverage and the maximum amounts of those coverages (limits of liability). RoA, pgs. 65 
through 63. 
21. The Liberty Mutual insurance policy at pages 2 and 3 includes the declarations pages 
(RoA, pgs. 65 through 63) which prominently list limits of coverage, including: 
Liability $100,000 per person, $300,000 per accident. 
Uninsured Motorists (Utah Specific) $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident 
Underinsured Motorists (Utah Specific) $25,000 per person, $50,000 per accident 
Personal Injury Protection (PIP - Utah Specific) $3,000 medical single limit 
22. Nowhere in the insurance policy declarations is there any listing of reduced limits 
of coverage for any persons insured under the Liberty Mutual insurance policy. RoA, pgs. 
65 through 63 
23. There is a listing of principal rating factors used in establishing rates in the Liberty 
Mutual insurance policy listed at pages 28 and .29 RoA, pgs. 39 and 38. 
24. The differing limit of liability for insureds is not a differing risk within the meaning 
of Utah Code §3 la-21-308; and, is not clearly stated as required by Utah Code 
§31 a-21 -308. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim Count One, para. 22 through 28, 
RoA, pgs. 76 and 75. 
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25. None of the listed rating factors include any reference to different rates or risks 
based on whether or not a claimant is an insured. Insurance Policy, RoA, pgs. 39 and 38. 
26. Buried on page 22 of the policy (RoA, pg. 45) is the family exclusion (or step down) 
liability limit provision which Liberty Mutual claims limits the liability of Liberty Mutual 
under the insurance policy to $25,000 for any liability claims by Burdene Shores. 
27. The family exclusion liability limit provision was hidden on page 22 of the policy 
with the intent to hide the provision and prevent the Shores' discovery of the family 
exclusion and thereby deny them the coverage which they reasonably believed they had 
purchased. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 20, RoA, pg. 76. 
28. The family exclusion liability limit for insureds is ambiguous, and not phrased in a 
manner that is understandable by ordinary people, and was so phrased and not disclosed in 
the declarations with the intent to hide the provision from the Shores and other similar 
insureds. Answer and Counterclaim, Counterclaim, Count One, para. 25 through 27, RoA, 
pgs. 76 and 75. 
29. If the family exclusion provision is valid, the Liberty Mutual insurance policy is not 
equivalent in coverage to the Met Life insurance policy of the Shores, which the Liberty 
Mutual insurance policy replaced. 
30. If the family exclusion liability limit provision is valid, there were false 
representations made by Liberty Mutual as to the coverage provided when the Liberty 
Mutual agent sold the Liberty Mutual insurance policy to the Shores. 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Improper Dismissal of the Bad-Faith Counterclaim 
Judge Pullan should have allowed the bad faith counterclaim of Burdene Shores to 
go forward. Dismissal, without discovery, was not proper. Burdene Shores was a first party 
bad faith claimant in direct privity of contract with Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual owed 
Burdene Shores a duty of good faith and fair dealing, which they violated by refusing to 
settle part of the claim for the $25,000 which all parties agreed was due to Burdene Shores. 
The bad faith counterclaim of Burdene Shores was improperly dismissed by Judge 
Pullan by misinterpreting Utah Appellate case law as Liberty Mutual requested. 
Improper Granting of Summary Judgment to Liberty Mutual and Dismissal of the 
Shores9 counterclaims for Declaratory Relief, by finding the Family Exclusion 
reduced liability limits in Liberty Mutual's Insurance Policy Valid and Enforceable 
The Liberty Mutual family exclusion liability limits provision in the insurance 
policy is not valid and is contrary to the public policy of Utah. 
If the court finds the Liberty Mutual family exclusion provision valid in Utah, 
Liberty Mutual did not properly make the provision a part of its policy, falsely represented 
the terms of its policy at the time of sale, and there are substantial factual questions which 
preclude summary judgment or dismissal of the counterclaims on the issue. 
The Liberty Mutual insurance policy violates Utah Code §3 la-21-308 by having 
differing policy limits of liability for insureds and claimants in general. The statute allows 
differing policy limits if there are different risks to be covered. There are no differing 
13 
risks associated with insureds under the insurance policy; and, the insurance policy does 
not clearly identify those differing risks even if such did exist. 
Failure to allow appropriate Discovery 
The trial court failed to require Liberty Mutual to properly engage in discovery, but 
allowed it to stall discovery in the case. 
There are substantial factual questions as to marketing practices to the Shores and 
specific false representations to the Shores which Judge Pullan should have allowed 
discovery regarding before ruling on any motion for summary judgment. 
If this court finds the Liberty Mutual family exclusion valid, the Shores should 
nonetheless be able to inquire into the marketing practices directed at the Shores and 
similar persons, and the false representations of policy provisions made by Liberty Mutual 
to the Shores in the sale of the insurance policy to them. 
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DETAILED ARGUMENTS 
The issues in this appeal are intertwined Because of the state of the facts, the state 
of the law, and Judge Pullan's decisions, it is not possible to nicely separate the issues for 
purposes of argument 
The underlying and overriding issues controlling all other issues in this case are 
• Whether the family exclusion reduced liability limits of Liberty Mutual's insurance 
policy in this case are valid and enforceable in general, and 
• If enforceable m general, is the family exclusion enforceable in specific application 
to the Shores under the facts of this case? Or stated differently, did Liberty Mutual validly 
include the family exclusion in the policy delivered to the Shores such that the Shores are 
bound by that provision? 
These issues were argued in Liberty Mutual's motion to dismiss the bad faith 
counterclaim, although that was not the basis chosen by Judge Pullan for granting the 
motion to dismiss 
A finding that the family exclusion of the insurance policy was generally valid and 
enforceable was the sole basis for Judge Pullan granting Liberty Mutual's Motion for 
summary judgment, and, dismissal of the Shores' declaratory judgment counterclaims 
against Liberty Mutual 
The family exclusion was hidden on page 22 of the 46-page insurance policy packet 
delivered to the Shores The family exclusion was not disclosed in the sales presentation 
The family exclusion is not listed m the declarations or anywhere else in the policy except 
in a Utah specific amendatory provision buried on page 22 of the 46-page insurance policy 
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This family exclusion will be discussed in greater detail throughout the arguments. 
The underlying moral issue presented by this appeal is the question as to whether the 
Utah courts will assist a multi-billion dollar insurance company in victimizing the aged and 
vulnerable who find themselves in situations they believe they have paid Liberty Mutual to 
protect them against? 
There are many facts which cannot be properly presented in this appeal because 
Liberty Mutual, though it filed the case, successfully stalled and prevented meaningful 
discovery by the Shores. 
Liberty Mutual is no white knight protecting their insureds as presented in insurance 
company advertisements. They prey on the aged and injured to bloat their profits, while 
denying benefits to those same aged and injured who have paid for protection and peace of 
mind promised by Liberty Mutual, but which Liberty Mutual had no intention of delivering 
if they could wiggle out of it. 
The legal arguments will be cast in differing lights by well-paid defense counsel, but 
the moral question is aptly framed. 
Improper Dismissal of the Bad-Faith Counterclaim 
Factually, there is no dispute that Burdene Shores is in actual direct privity of 
contract with Liberty Mutual. She was a co-insured under the policy of insurance issued by 
Liberty Mutual to she and her husband, Unior Shores - the Shores. 
Judge Pullan. reiving upon Sperry v. Sperry 990P.2d381, 1999 UT 101 (Utah 
1999), dismissed Burdene Shores' bad-faith counterclaim against Liberty Mutual by 
16 
finding, as a matter of law, that Burdene Shores was a third-party claimant, and there was 
therefore no privity of contract between Burdene Shores and Liberty Mutual. Judge Pullan 
found as a matter of law that as a third party claimant, no bad-faith claim could be asserted 
against Liberty Mutual by Burdene Shores under Sperry. 
It is obvious in both fact and reality that Burdene Shores is in direct privity of 
contract with Liberty Mutual as a co-insured under the insurance policy in this case. 
Judge Pullan misread Sperry. Judge Pullan ruled that no bad-faith claim could be 
asserted, regardless of any other factors. In Sperry the Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
position of the insurer (AMCO) that the factors which determine whether a claimant is a 
first-party or third-party claimant are transaction specific. Sperry^ supra, \\0 and ^[11. 
In Sperry^ the Utah Supreme Court specifically did not decide the issue as to 
whether, as in this case, Liberty Mutual could make false representations to its insureds to 
induce purchase of a contract and thereafter avoid liability as a consequence of those false 
representations based upon the falsely represented state of the insurance policy. See 
Sperry^ footnote l.1 
1
 Footnote 1 of Sperry^ states in part: "Annette also made a claim that AMCO 
misrepresented the terms of the insurance policy to her and Robert at the time the policy 
was purchased. The trial court dismissed this claim against AMCO after its determination 
that Annette was a third party. However, Annette's status as a third party in the wrongful 
death action and the misrepresentation and bad-faith actions based on the settlement 
negotiations should have no bearing on her claim that AMCO misrepresented the terms of 
the policy when the policy was purchased. In that context, Annette was a first-party 
purchaser. However, this issue was not briefed by either party and, as a general rule, we will 
not address issues that are not briefed on appeal. . . Additionally, we understand that the 
parties, during settlement negotiations, agreed that the household exclusion would not 
apply and eventually settled the wrongful death claim for the $100,000 policy limit. In light 
of that circumstance, it is difficult to see how Annette could prove any damages under her 
misrepresentation claim. Therefore, we decline to address this issue. " 
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A comparison of the facts in the Sperry case and this case is instructive -
remembering footnote 1 (quoted above) in Sperry - in considering the transaction specific 
facts under which this case should be viewed. 
Factors which are the same in Sperry and this case: 
1. There is a family exclusion provision in the insurance policy in both cases. 
2. The claimant is a named co-insured in both cases. There was thus direct and actual 
existing privity of contract in both cases. 
3. An adverse party for the underlying cause of action was the spouse of the claimant 
and a co-insured in both cases 
4. The claims against the adverse spouses in the underlying cause of action were 
presented based (at least partially) on tort theories in both cases. 
Factors which are different between Sperry and this case: 
1. In Sperry^ the family exclusion was total, meaning it excluded all insureds. In this 
case the family exclusion is a step down provision limiting liability to insureds to $25,000. 
2. In Sperry, there was no apparent claim of a first parly nexus or relationship 
underlying the challenged provision of the insurance policy. In this case, Liberty Mutual 
relies on the first party relationship of Burdene Shores to Liberty Mutual in enforcing the 
family exclusion provision of the insurance policy. 
3. In Sperry^ the claimant successfully challenged the family exclusion provision in 
the insurance policy; and, the insurer abandoned the family exclusion defense and paid the 
full amount of the policy limits liability claim before the bad-faith claim was presented to 
the court. 
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In this case, Liberty Mutual relies on the family exclusion as a defense to the 
bad-faith claim of Burdene Shores and asserts its validity for all purposes and has refused 
to pay anything without a full release of all claims. 
4. In Sperry. because the family exclusion was not an issue, in the underlying case the 
parties occupied totally adverse positions based solely on tort theories. The claimant had 
the same benefits of, and was entitled to be defended against, by the same methods as any 
other claimant. 
In this case, because the validity of the family exclusion liability limits is the real 
issue with those liability limits being based upon the privity of contract between Burdene 
Shores and Liberty Mutual, Burdene Shores has vastly reduced rights of recovery based on 
an adhesion contract provision governing the relationship between Liberty Mutual and 
Burdene Shores. 
Because of this issue, Liberty Mutual and Burdene Shores occupy both tort and 
contractual relationships in the underlying case. 
5. In Sperry. the bad-faith claim was based on the refusal of the insurer to pay what the 
claim was worth up to the maximum declared liability policy limits of $100,000. 
In this case, the bad-faith claim is based on the refusal of Liberty Mutual to pay the 
contractually claimed shield amount of the family exclusion liability limit of $25,000. 
Additional factors: 
1. The statutorily mandated minimum liability which both parties agree Burdene 
Shores is entitled to receive is the $25,000 which Liberty Mutual has failed and refused to 
pay to Burdene Shores. This is evidenced by the fact that Liberty Mutual has paid the 
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$25,000 into the trial court in this action, pending outcome of this case That statutorily 
mandated minimum is also the maximum Liberty Mutual insists it is obligated to pay 
2. Liberty Mutual has repeatedly refused to pay the $25,000 family exclusion amount 
which there is no question is due to Burdene Shores under any liability theory unless and 
until Burdene Shores gives a full and complete release for all claims against Liberty Mutual 
- particularly any liability claims exceeding the family exclusion liability limit 
3 This action by Liberty Mutual was and is being done in knowing and intentional 
violation of the public policy of Utah as stated in the statutes and rules of the Utah 
Insurance Department which govern Liberty Mutual's conduct in settlement activities with 
persons with whom they are in privity of contract 
4 In this case, Liberty Mutual made false representations to the Shores to induce them 
to purchase the insurance contract which Liberty Mutual now claims shields it from 
liability beyond the $25,000 family exclusion liability limit 
5 Judge Pullan refused to consider the Utah public policy or the false representations 
of Liberty Mutual, which are taken as true on a motion to dismiss and under his assumed 
state of facts on the motion for summary judgment in making his rulings There are still 
factual issues of great significance before a ruling on summary judgment could be proper, 
and dismissal was inappropriate 
In dismissing the bad-faith counterclaim against Liberty Mutual, Judge Pullan relied 
exclusively on finding as a matter of law that Burdene Shores was a third party as opposed 
to a first party bad-faith claimant for all purposes 
If Liberty Mutual had abandoned the family exclusion liability limits in this case, 
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then this case would be directly on point with Sperry. Liberty Mutual relies on the first 
party relationship with Burdene Shores to avoid payment of the declared policy limits, and 
using that same first party relationship claims that the family exclusion limits Liberty 
Mutual's liability to Burdene Shores to $25,000. A first party bad-faith claim is therefore 
proper by Burdene Shores against Liberty Mutual. 
Burdene Shores occupies positions both as a first party and third party claimant. 
In Blackv. Allstate. 2004 UT 66 (Utah 2004) the Utah Supreme Court held that 
Black could pursue a bad-faith claim against Allstate under a fact situation with similarities 
to both Sperry and this case, wherein the court held: 
cc |^16 When handling the Gallagher claim, Allstate acted in its capacity as Black's 
liability insurer and, therefore, potentially owed duties to Black based on Black's 
insurance policy. Hence, Black properly asserted a cause of action against Allstate 
based on his own contractual relationship with Allstate, and not on any alleged 
mishandling of the Black claim, which would only have implicated Allstate's 
contractual relationship with Gallagher." 
In this case Liberty Mutual refused to pay the $25,000 due to Burdene Shores based 
on the family exclusion liability limit founded on the contractual relationship between 
Liberty Mutual and Burdene Shores limiting liability to $25,000. The refusal to pay was 
not based on the lack of liability or arguable lack of liability of Unior Shores for Burdene 
Shores' injuries. 
Judge Pullan refused to consider that there was any first party contractual duty owed 
to Burdene Shores by Liberty Mutual based on the misapplication of Sperry. that there are 
no first party issues in this case. 
Under Black, where there are both first and third party issues, Burdene Shores is 
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entitled to pursue first party issues in a bad-faith claim against Liberty Mutual. 
The false representations to the Shores as to the terms of the insurance policy also 
make appropriate a bad-faith claim based on those false representations for purposes of the 
first party bad-faith claim. 
Because of the false representations of Liberty Mutual in negotiating the insurance 
policy, they support a first party claim for bad-faith against Liberty Mutual. 
There is also the issue as to whether the legislative requirements, as interpreted by 
the Utah Insurance Department, mean anything. 
Utah Administrative Rule R590-190-9, titled "Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and 
Practices Defined" in subsection (8) in further clarification of Utah Code §31A-26-
303(2)( c) and (3)(h), specifies the following to be misleading, deceptive, unfairly 
discriminatory or overreaching in the settlement of claims: 
" the failure to settle (and pay) claims by persons in privity of contract with an 
insurer within 30 days of the claim being made when liability is reasonably clear 
under one coverage in order to influence settlements under other portions of the 
insurance policy coverage." 
The public policy of Utah thus declared, while not providing a separate cause of 
action, provides guidance as to what Utah requires of Liberty Mutual when there is privity 
of contract with a claimant such as Burdene Shores. 
Burdene Shores is in actual direct privity of contract with Liberty Mutual about the 
insurance contract provision which is the primary subject of this case. Liberty Mutual 
seeks to enforce that provision based on that contractual privity. 
The fiction that persons in actual direct privity of contract are not in such privity was 
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created to allow an insurer to pursue all proper tort (non-contractual) defenses against 
liability to a claimant. In this case, Liberty Mutual has all proper tort defenses intact and 
additionally, Judge Pullan found that Burdene Shores, because of privity of contract with 
Liberty Mutual, cannot pursue any claims beyond the contractually limited family exclusion 
liability limit maximum which Liberty Mutual claims is due. 
In this case, following the fiction that there is no privity between Liberty Mutual and 
Burdene Shores is unfair and results in Liberty Mutual taking advantage of both tort and 
contractual defenses against Burdene Shores without any recourse by Burdene Shores. 
To sustain the fiction in this case, unfairly deprives Burdene Shores of her rights, 
and allows Liberty Mutual to defeat the declared public policy of Utah by contract. 
Improper Granting of Liberty MutuaPs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Dismissal of the Shores' claims for Declaratory Relief 
Liberty MutuaPs motion for summary judgment deals directly with the issue of the 
family exclusion liability limits provision of the insurance policy. 
Judge Pullan refused further discovery and ruled that the claims of Burdene Shores 
against her husband Unior Shores were governed by the family exclusion liability limits 
provision of the insurance policy. 
Judge Pullan refused to consider any factual issues, the failure of Liberty Mutual to 
follow Utah statutes and regulations in drafting its contract of adhesion, case law, or any 
matter other than the language of the family exclusion buried on page 22 of a 46-page 
insurance policy, the terms of which were only provided to the Shores after the insurance 
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policy was purchased; and, the terms of which were contrary to the express representations 
made by Liberty Mutual in selling the policy to the Shores. 
The Insurance Policy Fails to Clearly State the differing risks and Limits of Liability as 
required by statute 
Without specifically so stating, Judge Pullan implicitly ruled that Liberty Mutual is 
not required to follow Utah statutory law. 
Utah Code §31A-21-308 (enacted in 1985 in its present form) provides: 
"Limitations on loss to be borne by insurer. (1) An insurance policy 
indemnifying an insured against loss may by clear language limit the part of the loss 
to be paid by the insurer to a specified or determinable maximum amount, to loss in 
excess of a specified or determinable amount, to a specified proportion of the loss 
which may vary with the amount of the loss, or to any combination of these methods. 
If the policy covers various risks, different limitations may be provided 
separately for each risk, if the policy clearly states that." [Emphasis added] 
In this case, Liberty Mutual has provided different limits of liability between the 
general class of claimants, and the class of insured claimants. $100,000 for the general 
class of claimants - $25,000 for insured claimants, such as Burdene Shores. 
The insurance policy (on pgs. 28 and 29; RoA, pgs. 39 and 38) contains a long list 
of differing risks or rating factors which Liberty Mutual used in setting its rates in the 
insurance policy. None of those risks or rating factors include any reference to or relate in 
any way to an insured, by being an insured, as a risk or rating factor different from any other 
classification. Nowhere in the policy is there a statement that an insured, by being an 
insured, is a differing risk or rating factor. 
Looking at the insurance policy itself provides no information about how the 
different limitations and risk rating for "insureds" as Liberty Mutual has done was 
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determined.. 
Liberty Mutual argued in the trial court that differing risks under the statute are only 
differing types of coverage such as liability, uninsured motorist, underinsured motorist, 
PIP, etc. And, therefore that the differing coverage or limits of liability provided for 
insureds were not governed by this statute. 
By its plain language, Utah Code §31A-21-308 only allows differing limits of 
liability for differing risks if those differing risks and limits of coverage are clearly stated. 
Conversely, the statute does not allow differing limits of liability where there are no 
differing risks or the limits of such differing risk coverage are not clearly stated. 
Differing types of coverage are certainly differing risks and their differing risks and 
coverage limits are clearly stated in the insurance policy declarations. 
The statute only allows differing limits of coverage if there are differing risks 
associated with those differing limits of coverage and those differing limits and risks are 
clearly stated. 
This issue turns on the definition of a "risk". 
Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition (1999), p. 1328, among many definitions 
defines "risk" as: 
" 1 . The chance of injury, damage or loss, damages or hazard 
* * * 
3. Insurance. The chance or degree of probability of loss to the subject matter of 
an insurance policy <the insurer undertook the risk in exchange for a premium>. 
4. Insurance. The amount that an insurer stands to lose <the underwriter took steps 
to reduce its total risk>. 
5. Insurance. A person or thing that an insurer considers a hazard; someone or 
something that might be covered by an insurance policy <she's a poor risk for health 
insurances 
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6. Insurance. The type of loss covered by a policy; a hazard from a specific source 
<this homeowner's policy covers fire risks and flood risks>." 
In the Funk & Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary (1963) p. 1160, "risk" is 
defined as: 
"In insurance, hazard of loss, as of a ship or cargo, or of goods or other property; 
also, degree of exposure to loss or injury. An obligation or contract of insurance on 
the part of an insurer to take a risk . . .An applicant for an insurance policy 
considered with regard to the advisability of placing insurance upon him. . ." 
In Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971) p. 1961, among many 
definitions, "risk" is defined as: 
"3 a. (1) : The chance of loss or the perils to the subject matter of insurance 
covered by a contract. (2): The degree of probability of such loss. . . . c. person or 
thing judged as a (specified) hazard to an insurer (a poor ~ for insurance) d. an 
insurance hazard from a (specified) cause or source (war ~) (disaster - ) . " 
Many other similar definitions could be cited. 
The usually accepted definition of a "risk" can thus be a line of insurance coverage 
as claimed by Liberty Mutual, and can also be an applicant or class of applicants considered 
with regard to the advisability of placing insurance upon them. This latter definition is 
appropriate to this issue in this case. 
The Utah Insurance Code does not directly define what is meant by a "risk", but does 
give definition by implication in other definitions. 
Utah Code §31A-1-301. Definitions. States in part: 
'(135) (a) "Rate" means: 
(I) the cost of a given unit of insurance; or 
(ii) for property-casualty insurance, that cost of insurance per 
exposure unit either expressed as: 
(A) a single number; or 
(B) a pure premium rate, adjusted before any application of 
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individual risk variations based on loss or expense considerations 
to account for the treatment of: 
(I) expenses; 
(II) profit; and 
(III) individual insurer variation in loss experience." 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah Code §31A-19a-102. Definitions, states in part: 
'(12) (a) "Rate" means that cost of insurance per exposure unit either expressed as: 
(I) a single number; or 
(ii) as a pure premium rate, adjusted before any application of 
individual risk variations, based on loss or expense considerations 
to account for the treatment of: 
(A) expenses; 
(B) profit; and 
( C) individual insurer variation in loss experience, 
(b) "Rate" does not include a minimum premium. 
(13) "Rating tiers" means an underwriting and rating plan designed to categorize 
insurance risks that have common characteristics related to potential insurance 
loss into broad groups for the purpose of establishing a set of rating levels that 
reflect definable levels of potential hazard or risk. 
It is apparent that both of the above statutes and Utah Code §31A-21-308 closely 
relate rates to their associated risks. 
In West Jordan v. Morrison^ 656 P.2d 445 (Utah 1982) the court stated: 
"We have frequently stated that this Court's primary responsibility in construing 
legislative enactments is to give effect to the Legislature's underlying intent. See, 
e.g.. Millett v. Clark Clinic Cory.. Utah, 609 P.2d 934 (1980). We have also said 
that a statute should be applied according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable. See Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 
434 P.2d 449 (1967). We must assume that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied 
according to its usually accepted meaning. Where the ordinary meaning of the terms 
results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in 
blatant contradiction to the express purpose of the statute, it is not the duty of this 
Court to assess the wisdom of the statutory scheme." 
Many cases state this same principle. See, for example, Alternative Options v. 
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Chapman. 2004 UT App 488, 106 P 3d 744 (Utah App 2004), Alhant Techsystem, Inc. v 
Tax Comm , 2003 UT App 374 80 P 3d 582 (Utah App 2003) 
In absence of a clear contrary definition of "risks" in the statute, the ordinary and 
usually accepted meaning prevails 
The statutes clearly require rates to be set based on risks By setting differing limits 
of liability for insureds, as opposed to the limits for the general public, Liberty Mutual has 
created a separate risk classification for insureds Liberty Mutual failed to clearly identify 
that risk or the rating factors associated with that risk in its insurance policy 
Because of the failure of Liberty Mutual to base the differing limits of liability for 
insureds under the insurance policy on differing risks, the limits of liability structure 
violates Utah Code §31A-21-308 
Judge Pullan refused to allow further discovery to determine how Liberty Mutual set 
its rates and what risks and other factors were considered in setting the liability limits and 
rates for insureds as opposed to the liability limits and rates that were different from those 
applied to claimants in general 
At a minimum, the issue of risk and rating factors invites and requires significant 
further discovery which Liberty Mutual has refused to provide, to determine how or 
whether the class of insureds is a valid basis of a differing risk and rate structure by Liberty 
Mutual 
Hidden (on page 22, RoA, pg 45) in the insurance policy, are the different liability 
limits or family exclusion liability limits applicable to liability claims made by the class of 
insureds under the policy There is no differing risk or rating factor identified as the 
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differing risk associated with being an insured. Even if there were in fact differing risks, 
those rates and risks are not clearly stated as the statutory structure requires. 
The statement of differing policy limits for insureds is not clearly stated in the 
insurance policy. 
All other policy limits given in the insurance policy refer to the declarations of the 
policy. Looking at the declarations (pgs. 2 through 4 of the insurance policy - RoA, pgs. 
65 through 63), there is a list of policy limits for: 
Liability - both bodily injury and property damage stated as simple dollar amounts. 
Uninsured Motorists - both bodily injury and property damage stated as simple 
dollar amounts. 
Underinsured Motorists - bodily injury stated as simple dollar amounts. 
PIP stated as simple dollar amounts. 
Comprehensive stated as actual cash value less a deductible. 
Collision stated as actual cash value less a deductible. 
Towing stated as a simple dollar amount. 
All policy limits - except the liability limits under the family exclusion for 
insureds only, buried on page 22 of the insurance policy, are stated in the declarations in an 
easily found, easily read and easily understandable fashion. In most cases, and as 
appropriate, these limits are stated as simple dollar amounts. 
Why is the liability limit for insureds stated in a very obscure location and in an 
obtuse fashion? It is difficult for an attorney, let alone a normal person or the aged Shores 
in this case to understand what is being said in the family exclusion liability limits 
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provision of the insurance policy. It is not clearly stated. 
The Liberty Mutual insurance policy was marketed to elderly, retired veterans. They 
are responsible to know the market and generally reduced mental capacities of that group. 
The question is thus, what does the Utah Code §31A-21-308 requirement of being 
"clearly stated" mean? 
Simple dollar amounts are clearly stated. Actual cash values are clearly stated. 
All of the coverage limits of the insurance policy stated in the declarations appear 
clearly stated. 
Are the different exclusionary liability limits for insureds clearly stated? Judge 
Pullan found that they were, without allowing any factual inquiry. 
Was the placement of the family exclusion - buried deep within the insurance policy 
where almost no-one, except lawyers - dare to tread, done to obscure the provision and 
make sure insureds would not know about it unless there was a claim? That is a fact 
question which a jury should decide, after the opportunity for appropriate discovery. 
The issue as to whether the limit of liability for insureds is clearly stated, is a fact 
question for the jury. However, further examination of the issue is helpful. 
A recitation of the family exclusion buried on page 22 (RoA, pg. 45) of the 
insurance policy illustrates the lack of clarity. The insurance policy states, under the page 
caption of "Amendment of Policy Provisions - Utah": 
1. Part A. Liability Coverage. 
Part A is amended as follows: 
"Paragraph A of the Insuring Agreement is replaced by the following: 
A. We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" for which any 
"insured" becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. We will 
settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for 
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these damages. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense 
costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability 
for this coverage has been exhausted by payment of judgment or settlements. 
We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" not covered under this policy. 
B. The following exclusion is added: 
We do not provide Liability Coverage for any "insured" for "bodily injury" to 
you to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the 
applicable minimum limits for liability specified by UTAH CODE ANN. 
Section 31A-22-304. The applicable minimum limits are: 
1. $65,000 for each accident, if the limits of liability for this coverage is 
a single limit that applies for each accident; or 
2. $25,000 for each person / $50,000 for each accident, if the limit of 
liability for this coverage is indicated as a split limit." 
An attorney must read through the above family exclusion several times before there 
is any certainty about what is being said. 
How would a normal 50 year old understand the provision? How would a normal 75 
year old understand it? How would a normal 81 year old understand it? 
Judge Pullan's apparant finding, as a matter of law, that the liability limits for 
insureds are clearly stated in the insurance policy is clearly erroneous. 
Liberty MutuaVs physical construction of the insurance policy is intended to confuse 
and create a lack of clarity 
All the limits of coverage for the insurance policy are contained in the declarations, 
except for the family exclusion liability limit for insureds. Liberty Mutual used the family 
exclusion to deny proper coverage to Burdene Shores. 
In absence of the family exclusion, plainly stated in the insurance policy 
declarations (pg. 3; RoA, pg. 64) there is a coverage limit of liability for bodily injury to 
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Burdene Shores in this case of $100,000. 
In absence of the family exclusion, clearly stated on page 8 of the insurance policy 
(RoA, pg. 59) there is a reference to the policy limits of liability, as stated in the 
declarations, as the maximum Liberty Mutual is obligated to pay in this case to Burdene 
Shores. 
Stated on pgs. 8, 9 and 10 of the insurance policy (RoA pgs. 59, 58 and 57) is a list 
of clearly stated exclusions from liability coverage for a number of actions and situations. 
They are true exclusions, not the confusing step down family exclusion provision hidden on 
page 22 of the insurance policy. 
Plainly stated on page 10 of the insurance policy (RoA, pg. 57) is the contractual 
definition of the "Limit of Liability" Liberty Mutual is obligated to pay to Burdene 
Shores in this case. It states: 
"LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
A. The Limit of Liability shown in the Declarations for each person for 
Bodily Injury liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages, 
including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of the 
"bodily injury" sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject 
to this limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the 
Declarations for each accident for Bodily Injury Liability is maximum limit 
of liability for all damages for "bodily injury" resulting from any one auto 
accident." [Emphasis added] 
This contract definition of the "limit of liability" is the definition which controls 
the insurance policy in this case. That limit of liability is clearly the limit of liability stated 
in the declarations. Nowhere in the insurance policy is the definition of limit of liability 
modified from the above. 
The definition repeatedly makes absolute reference to the policy limits specified in 
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the declarations as the most Liberty Mutual is obligated to pay to Burdene Shores. 
Hidden on page 22 (RoA, pg. 45) of the insurance policy is the family exclusion, a 
Utah specific amendment which is first a reference to the policy limits of liability (as 
specified in the declarations) which is substantively identical to the provision on page 8 of 
the insurance policy, with an added obtuse and confusing, part CB' exclusion that Liberty 
Mutual will not provide coverage to the extent that the applicable policy limits exceed the 
applicable minimum limits for liability specified by Utah Code §31A-22-304, and then 
states that those applicable minimum limits - not the maximum, or policy limits to be 
paid, are $25,000 for an insured. The policy does not call this a policy limit, but calls it an 
exclusion or minimum limit. That is ambiguous and it is not plain to a non-elderly and 
certainly not an elderly person of ordinary intelligence. At worst, this ambiguity is a 
factual question for the jury, not for a pronouncement of law by Judge Pullan. 
A clearly stated limit of liability would have been $25,000 per person, $50,000 per 
accident, stated in the declarations to the insurance policy with all other limits of coverage 
- including other Utah specific limits. That did not occur. 
The Structure of the insurance policy and placement of Liberty Mutual9 s family 
exclusion limits of liability statements in the insurance policy were intended to confuse 
and mislead purchasers of insurance. 
The structure of the insurance policy has: 
1. A set of limits of liability stated in the declarations on pages 2 and 3. 
2. A reference to the limits of liability of the declarations stating that is the 
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maximum Liberty Mutual is obligated to pay on page 8. 
3. A definition of limits of liability referring to the declarations, stating those 
are the limits of liability on page 10. 
4. An amendment (the Utah specific family exclusion), which first refers to the 
limits of liability stated in the declarations, followed by a confusingly 
worded exclusion which reduces those limits of liability to something only 
one-fourth (1/4) of that stated in the declarations. This is located on page 22 
of the insurance policy. 
Liberty Mutual created the structure of the policy. 
Liberty Mutual stated affirmatively at least four (4) times in the insurance policy 
that the liability limits were as stated in the declarations. 
By a confusing exclusionary amendment, Liberty Mutual then changes those policy 
limits for insured to something different than that stated in the declarations. 
Liberty Mutual created the policy - including its confusing structure. 
The format of the insurance policy follows something which might have been 
necessary in the late 1800s, where, because of the printing technology of the time, it was 
arguably necessary to attach amendments so that an agreement could be created with 
variations without having a secretary laboriously retype or rewrite everything, each time 
with the likelihood of many errors creeping in. 
In the technology of the 21st century, or the mid-20th century, it is trivial to prevent 
conflicting amendments and provisions in an insurance policy when it is originally issued. 
There is an argument for amendments after original insurance policy issuance to be 
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as additional non-included pages. There is no valid argument for the original issue of an 
insurance policy to include multiple and conflicting definitions of the same terms. 
The simplest level of that technology which would be more than adequate to avoid 
confusing and conflicting separate amendments is word processing - perhaps a merge 
document. The correct provisions could easily be included in line in the policy in one 
appropriate place without duplication and without conflicting provisions. 
What Liberty Mutual has done in the insurance policy would be equivalent to this 
brief being prepared as a stock document with a cover sheet having the names of the parties, 
and the issues on appeal. Then a core having allegations of jurisdiction, the statutes and 
rules which are relevant to this appeal in New York and California. The case law that is 
relevant in New York and California and a conclusion. Then, at the back of the brief, is an 
attachment with Utah statutes and cases which really control and a statement that the New 
York and California law presented at the beginning doesn't mean anything. It is just added 
to pad the document because that's the way it done and to make it confusing. 
Then this court is supposed to ignore all arguments which don't apply to the case. 
The court would then be required to sift through all non-relevant arguments and find the real 
arguments in the brief. 
The above hypothetical is stretching things. But actually not as much as exists in the 
insurance policy. At least in appeals there are lawyers who probably have seen many 
appellate briefs or court arguments, and know to look at the back to find the real law. With 
insurance consumers, they don't have that experience, education or training with multiple 
insurance contracts and don't know that the amendments are hidden at the back or in the 
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middle, and what they mean. 
With a simple word processing merge type document, there is no need for any 
conflicting provisions in an originally issued insurance policy, or contradictory limits of 
liability in more than one place. 
It would not be reasonable for Liberty Mutual to allow its billing and accounting 
practices to exist in the fashion common in the 1800s - the manual use of quill and pen to 
track payments, underwriting and liabilities. Neither is it reasonable for Liberty Mutual to 
mislead innocent consumers by purposefully using the confusing lack of document creation 
technology of the 1800s in the 21st century and then claim innocent purchasers should 
understand that clearly stated limits of liability are reduced by a hidden, obtuse, ambiguous, 
and conflicting exclusion. 
Liberty Mutual can choose any method in creating its insurance policy forms. 
However, Liberty Mutual is bound by and liable for the reasonableness of the method 
chosen, the conflicting provisions, ambiguities and problems created by failing to use 
current technology which is readily available to eliminate intentional ambiguities, 
confusion and problems which it has thus created. 
The controlling case law in Utah is Farmers v. Versaw. 2004 UT 73, 99 P. 3d 796 
(Utah 2004), wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that an insurance contract was 
ambiguous and stated: 
c
^j8 To communicate its terms with adequate clarity, a contract of insurance must 
use language and grammar capable of understanding by a reasonable insurance 
purchaser. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. SandL 854 P.2d 519, 521-22 (Utah 1993). We 
have formulated the test for insurance contract clarity this way: 
'Would the meaning [of the language of the insurance contract] be plain to a 
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person of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly 
and reasonably, in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the 
words, and in the light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the 
policyf?]' LDSHosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.. 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 
1988) (quoting Auto Lease Co. v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co.. 7 Utah 2d 336, 339, 
325 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1958)). 
fl9 This test is supplemented by our observation that ambiguities typically appear in 
two forms: 'An ambiguity in a contract may arise (1) because of vague or ambiguous 
language in a particular provision or (2) because two or more contract provisions, 
when read together, give rise to different or inconsistent meanings, even though 
each provision is clear when read alone.' Sandt. 854 P.2d at 523. Both types of 
ambiguity infect the terms of Farmers's E-Z Reader Car Policy . ." 
In this case, the existing circumstances are that the insurance policy was marketed to 
elderly, retired, veterans. Liberty Mutual intentionally used the technology of the 1800s to 
create an ambiguous, conflicting and confusing insurance policy when a simple 
non-confusing policy could easily have been created using mid-20th century technology. 
The concepts stated in Versaw should be expanded, if necessary, to include 
ambiguities caused by confusing and contradictory insurance policy structure 
intentionally created by Liberty Mutual when such structure is ambiguous, 
contradictory, obtuse and not easily understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. 
In this case the vague and obtuse family exclusion liability limits do not clearly state 
liability limits for insureds. They state an exclusionary minimum limit. They are hidden 
deep within the insurance policy. Exclusions are not easily understood by a person of 
ordinary intelligence unless clearly stated and placed to be easily found. In this case the 
exclusion was not clearly stated so as to be understood by a person of normal intelligence, 
and it took diligence to even find the family exclusion. 
In USF&G v. SandU 1993.UT.146, 854 P.2d 519 (1993) at 522 the Utah Supreme 
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Court stated: 
"The extent of USF&G's liability in this case turns on the language of USF&G's 
policy and the rules of construction that apply to insurance policies. Since 1921 
this Court has expressed its commitment to the principle that 'insurance policies 
should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to 
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance.' . . . 
* * * 
In the usual situation the insured makes application for a policy which is described 
to him in general terms. He seldom sees it until it is issued and delivered to him. He 
is not acquainted with its numerous refinements and particularly the exclusions from 
coverage. For this reason the rule of strictissimi juris has been applied almost 
universally to insurance contracts, giving a liberal construction in favor of the 
insured toward the coverage which the insured reasonably could assume he is buying 
and for which he pays his premium. We have heretofore held that the insured is 
entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand from the policy. 
It follows that ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly 
susceptible to different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage. . . . 
. It also follows that if an insurance contract has inconsistent provisions, one which 
can be construed against coverage and one which can be construed in favor of 
coverage, the contract should be construed in favor of coverage. . . ." 
In this case there are directly contradictory provisions created by Liberty Mutual's 
intentionally confusing structure of the insurance policy. 
Four statements are made in the insurance policy that the limit of liability is stated 
in the declarations. 
There is one ambiguous, obtuse and confusing exclusionary statement that the policy 
liability limits for insureds is not as stated in the declarations. 
Liberty Mutual seeks to enforce the exclusionary statement which it has hidden deep 
in the insurance policy with the apparent intent to hide it's meaning from its insureds to 
whom it has specifically marketed the insurance policy - elderly, retired veterans. 
If the family exclusion provision is valid at all, the Liberty Mutual insurance policy 
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in this case violates Versgw7 and the intent expressed in Versaw. 
Validity of the Family Exclusion Provision of Liberty Mutual's insurance policy. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of the validity of the family exclusion 
in insurance policies in Utah. In Farmers v. Call 1985.UT.229, 712 P.2d231 (1985) at II: 
"The next issue is whether a household exclusion clause in an automobile policy is 
valid as to the policy limits in excess of the statutory minimums. The defendant 
offers two alternative theories. First, she claims that the exclusion clause is void as 
against public policy. Secondly, she argues that in the event the household exclusion 
clause is found to be void as to minimum coverages, it should be voided entirely 
since neither she nor her husband ever had notice of the existence or import of the 
household exclusion. We agree with the defendant's second theory and decline to 
address at this time the validity of the household exclusion clause in excess of 
the statutory minimums. 
* * * 
[AJutomobile insurance is generally sold through adhesion contracts that are not 
negotiated at arm's length. Purchasers commonly rely on the assumption that they 
are fully covered by the insurance that they buy. Because of this, public policy 
requires that persons purchasing such policies are entitled to be informed, in 
writing, of the essential terms of insurance contracts, especially exclusionary 
terms. 
We therefore hold that where the insurer fails to disclose material exclusions in an 
automobile insurance policy and the purchaser is not informed of them in writing, 
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclosure, the household exclusion clause 
fails to 'honor the reasonable expectations' of the purchaser, rendering the 
exclusion clause invalid as to the entire policy limits." [citations omitted, emphasis 
added] 
A good discussion of the general factors underlying the family exclusion is 
presented in Meyer v. State Farm. 689 P. 2d 585, 52 ALR4th (Colorado 1984) wherein the 
court held the family exclusion invalid. The statutory structure in Colorado was similar to 
Utah's structure. The court first found the family exclusion invalid as to limits below the 
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minimum mandatory (no fault) coverage amounts, and then went on to find at page 13: 
"In summary, we hold that the household exclusion is invalid. The exclusion 
is neither authorized by statute nor in harmony with the legislative purpose 
mandating liability insurance to provide coverage for bodily injury and property 
damages to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of accidents. 
* * * 
An additional issue is raised . . . State Farm argues that if the household 
exclusion clause is invalid, the limits of liability should be restricted to . . . the 
minimum amount of liability coverage required by the Act. . . rather than the full 
amount of liability coverage provided by the policy. In order to resolve this issue, 
we must choose between two equally compelling arguments. 
The view which supports the position advanced by State Farm can be 
summarized as follows: Where an automobile insurance policy contains an 
exclusion which is declared invalid because it conflicts with a statute mandating 
liability coverage and the policy limits exceed the minimum statutory requirements, 
the carrier's liability is limited to the minimum coverage required by statute. . . . 
However, we are more persuaded by the insured's argument. The Act 
specifically provides that insurance policies may provide greater coverage than the 
minimum specified in the Act. . . This provision is consistent with the legislative 
intent to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents. . . . 
Here the insured purchased more coverage than required by the Act. We hold that 
where the household exclusion has been held invalid because it violates the Act, the 
limits of the carrier's liability are those provided by the policy and not the lesser 
limits required by the statutory standard." 
(Citations Omitted) 
In Call there was no evidence that Farmers ever delivered the policy to its insureds. 
The variant factual question presented in this case is whether Liberty Mutual materially 
failed to deliver (or actively hid) the family exclusion policy provision on which they rely 
in denying appropriate coverage; and, whether the Shores were therefore not substantively 
informed of the exclusion in writing. 
A corollary issue in this case is whether placing the family exclusion liability limits 
for insureds in an obscure location of a lengthy policy - without being specified in the 
declarations, defeats any written notice the insurance policy may arguably provide. 
In this case, there was no substantive written notice to the Shores of the family 
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exclusion liability limits for insureds. Call covers the situation of this case, or if it does 
not, should be extended to cover this situation. 
Liberty Mutual owes a duty of reasonable disclosure, especially when it 
intentionally markets its products to elderly, retired persons. It may be reasonably inferred 
that Liberty Mutual relied on the confusion and trust of elderly, retired insureds to 
misrepresent the facts regarding coverage provided by its insurance policy in this case. 
Liberty Mutual knew that few, if any, insureds - especially elderly insureds, would 
ever read a lengthy policy, or understand it if they read it. Liberty Mutual relied on that. At 
a minimum, the Shores should have been allowed to conduct discovery on this issue. 
In State Farm v. Mastbaum 1987.UT.33h 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld a family exclusion for automobile insurance policies issued 
pre-1986. However, in Mastbaum^ two justices (Howe joined by Hall) wrote the main 
plurality opinion; two justices (Zimmerman joined by Stewart) wrote a concurring opinion 
with the statement that if the insurance policy which was the basis of the case had been 
issued post the 1986 amendments to the Utah Statutes, then the family exclusion would 
have been entirely invalid. Justice Durham dissented also arguing that the family exclusion 
was entirely invalid both post and pre-1986. 
Judge Pullan refused to follow Mastbaum by stating that the comments of Justice 
Zimmerman in the concurring opinion were simply dicta and were not controlling. 
Since "dicta" is any statement not necessary to the decision immediately before the 
court, Justice Zimmerman's statements in the concurring opinion were dicta as were the 
statements of Justice Durham in the dissenting opinion. However, that dicta and that 
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dissenting opinion combined constituted a majority of the court and was given to guide 
future cases, including this case. The concurring opinion dicta and dissenting opinion of 
Mastbaum is controlling law which this court should uphold and follow in this case. 
Mastbaum is consistent with the arguments and holding of Meyer v. State Farm. 
supra, and should be followed as the law in Utah. 
Judge Pullan improvidently relied on Calhoun v. State Farm. 96 P.3d 916, 2004 UT 
56 (Utah 2004) and Allstate v. U.S.F&G. 1980.UT.223, 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980) for the 
proposition that parties are free to have any exclusions agreed to in excess of the minimum 
statutory limits required by law. These two cases are factually not in point with this case. 
Both cases involve coverage for specifically excluded drivers under insurance policies. 
Utah Code §31A-22-303(7) specifically provides for the exclusion of named drivers under 
specified circumstances. Such exclusions are valid if the statutory requirements are 
satisfied. In these cases the statutory requirements were satisfied and the exclusions were 
therefore valid. 
Because specific statutorily authorized exclusions are permissible does not equate 
to the Liberty Mutual family exclusion being valid in this case. There is no statutory 
approval for the family exclusion. 
The family exclusion provision of Liberty Mutual in this case is invalid as against 
the public policy of Utah post-1986 under Mastbaum. supra 
Liberty Mutual's false representations, that the Liberty Mutual insurance policy 
contained the same coverage as the Shores9 prior insurance policy, make the family 
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exclusion liability limits for insureds unenforceable. 
Liberty Mutual, through their agent Ryan Farnsworth, falsely represented to the 
Shores that the Liberty Mutual insurance policy which Farnsworth convinced the Shores to 
purchase contained the same coverage as the policy it was replacing from Met Life. 
Facts were presented by affidavit both supporting this fact and opposing it. Judge 
Pullan refused to consider this factual dispute and ruled it made no difference to his ruling. 
See para. 15 and 16 of Judge Pullan's judgment and order dated January 27, 2005 (RoA, 
page 437). See also, pgs. 18, 19; 29, 38, 45 and 48 through 54 of the Transcript of 
December 10, 2005 hearing. 
Judge Pullan, in effect, ruled that the false representations of Liberty Mutual to the 
Shores (who are elderly, retired purchasers of insurance) as to the coverage they were 
purchasing cannot be inquired into; and, in any event do not overcome the falsely 
represented and materially undisclosed family exclusion which Liberty Mutual, after the 
sale, had hidden in the insurance policy actually delivered to the Shores. 
Judge Pullan also ruled that no discovery on this issue may be had, since it does not 
matter to the outcome of the case. 
The conduct of Liberty Mutual and Judge Pullan's upholding of that conduct 
constitute a travesty of justice which should have a remedy. The minimum remedy is that 
the Shores should have the opportunity to inquire into Liberty MutuaFs sales practices to 
elderly, retired veterans including the Shores, and more particularly into the false 
representations of their insurance agent, Ryan Farnsworth, in this case. 
Liberty Mutual argued at the December 10, 2004 hearing on their motion for 
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summary judgment that the Family Exclusion provision of their insurance policy was the 
same as the Met Life policy which it replaced. That is clearly false. 
The Met Life policy contains a clearly invalid total family exclusion under 
Mgsfbgum, supra. 
Liberty Mutual convinced Judge Pullan that the Liberty Mutual family exclusion was 
the same as the Met Life family exclusion. Such is not the case. 
A clearly drafted and disclosed family exclusion in excess of the statutory 
minimums may be valid if the clear language of the concurring and dissenting opinions in 
Mastbaum are ignored and construed as non-controlling dicta. 
However, the total family exclusion in the Met Life policy is clearly invalid under 
the holding oiMastbaum^ unless the court places language in the Met Life insurance policy 
which does not exist. 
If the Liberty Mutual family exclusion liability limits for insureds were clearly 
drafted and properly disclosed and therefore could be enforceable, is not the same as the 
Met Life total family exclusion which is clearly invalid. 
There was therefore, in fact, a misrepresentation of policy limits and terms by 
Liberty Mutual to induce the sale of the insurance policy. 
This misrepresentation makes the family exclusion provision of the insurance policy 
unenforceable by Liberty Mutual. 
The exact mechanism leading to unenforceability will be determined in appropriate 
discovery, including one or more of the following theories to be pursued based on the 
outcome of that discovery: 
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a request to reform the contract to reflect the intent of the parties, 
a misrepresentation claim for damages against Liberty Mutual, and 
fraud at the inception and a claim for damages against Liberty Mutual. 
Improper refusal to allow the Shores to conduct appropriate discovery on issues of 
Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment 
Liberty Mutual is the plaintiff in this case. The case was filed February 9, 2004 by 
Liberty Mutual. 
Liberty Mutual stalled discovery until September of 2004. A minimal amount of 
discovery was done, but no meaningful disclosures were ever made by Liberty Mutual. 
Liberty Mutual filed its motion for summary judgment on September 16, 2004. Oral 
argument on that motion occurred on December 10, 2004. Judge Pullan denied any further 
discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion. 
Liberty Mutual's motion for summary judgment was essentially treated as a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or motion for dismissal, without benefit of any substantive 
discovery. There are many factual issues which need to be inquired into as pointed out in 
the preceding arguments. It was improper for Judge Pullan to allow Liberty Mutual to stall, 
and certainly improper to deny the benefit of further discovery, when there are meaningful 
and significant factual disputes which should have precluded summary judgment without 
benefit of appropriate discovery. Those factual issues include: 
1. Facts surrounding misrepresentations in the sale of the insurance policy to the 
Shores. 
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2. The marketing practices of Liberty Mutual to elderly retired military personnel, 
including: 
(a) The intent of Liberty Mutual in failing to disclose the family exclusion in the 
declarations; and, 
(b) The reasons the family exclusion is not stated in an understandable and clear 
fashion as required by Utah law. 
3. How often Liberty Mutual has taken advantage of insureds in Utah by improperly 
enforcing an invalid family exclusion to deny appropriate coverage, as specified in the 
declarations. 
4. Liberty Mutual's use of the family exclusion provision in other states. 
5. The hiding of the family exclusion liability limits outside of the insurance policy 
declarations, and reasons for non-placement in the declarations; and, 
6. The reasons for lack of clarity in structure and wording of the family exclusion 
policy limits. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELTEF SOUGHT 
Burdene Shores' Bad-Faith Counterclaim against Liberty Mutual Should be 
Allowed to go Forward 
Burdene Shores' bad-faith counterclaim was improperly dismissed by Judge Pullan. 
The bad-faith counterclaim was based on the first party contractual relationship of Burdene 
Shores to Liberty Mutual, not her (also present) third party claim for damages against her 
co-insured husband. The determination of whether a claim is first party or third party is 
transaction specific.2 
Liberty Mutual holds fast to the claim that because Burdene Shores had agreed to 
the family exclusion provision as an insurance co-purchaser, Liberty Mutual had no 
obligation to pay more than the family exclusion amount to Burdene Shores. 
The bad-faith claim is based on this claimed contractual limitation on which Liberty 
Mutual strongly relies. 
The bad-faith occurred because there is no issue that Burdene Shores is entitled to 
recover the $25,000. Liberty Mutual has refused to pay the $25,000 to her without a 
complete release of all liability, even though Burdene Shores' medical specials exceed that 
$25,000. 
Utah public policy requires Liberty Mutual to pay Burdene Shores' claim for 
$25,000 because the liability is reasonably clear; and, Liberty Mutual may not use 
non-payment of that reasonably clear claim to force settlement under other portions of the 
insurance policy. Such payment was required to be made within 30 days of the claim being 
2
 See discussion Sperry v. Sperry, footnote 1, supra. 
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made3. Conduct such as Liberty Mutual followed in this case is an unfair claims settlement 
practice. 
It is requested that Judge Pullan's dismissal of Burdene Shores' bad-faith 
counterclaim be reversed, the bad-faith counterclaim be reinstated and allowed to proceed 
to discovery and as appropriate, to trial. 
The Summary Judgment for Liberty Mutual and Dismissal of the Shores1 
Counterclaims Should be Reversed and the Case Allowed to Go to Trial 
Judge Pullan improperly found Liberty Mutual's family exclusion provision both 
generally valid and valid in the circumstances of this case. 
Liberty Mutual's family exclusion is invalid as against Utah public policy, and 
invalid in the context of this case because of false representations of the sales agent in 
selling the insurance policy to the Shores. 
It is requested that the granting of summary judgment and dismissal of the Shores' 
counterclaims for declaratory relief be reversed. 
It is requested that the Liberty Mutual style of family exclusion be declared invalid 
and against the public policy of Utah. 
It is requested that the Liberty Mutual family exclusion be found invalid and 
unenforceable against the Shores because of the false representations of Liberty Mutual in 
3
 See discussion under Detailed Argument, Improper Dismissal of the Bad-Faith 
Counterclaim, Additional Factors, supra, for discussion of Utah Administrative Rule R590-
190-9, titled "Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and Practices Defined" in subsection (8) in 
clarification of Utah Code §31A-26-303. 
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the sale of the insurance policy; or, at a minimum, that summary judgment and the dismissal 
be reversed and the Shores be allowed to conduct discovery on the issues. 
If the Liberty Mutual family exclusion is generally found to be valid, it is requested 
that the case be allowed to proceed on the factual issues surrounding the false 
representations which induced the Shores to purchase the insurance policy to determine the 
validity of the insurance policy under the facts of this case. 
It is requested that the Shores be allowed to move forward and go to trial on their 
counterclaims for declaratory relief against Liberty Mutual. 
The Shores should be allowed appropriate Discovery before Dispositive Rulings by 
the Court 
The trial court improperly allowed Liberty Mutual to stall discovery in this case; 
and, improperly refused to allow further discovery before ruling on Liberty Mutual's 
motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the Shores' declaratory judgment claims. 
The summary judgment and dismissal should be reversed and remanded for further 
discovery before ruling on a fact-dependant motion which Liberty Mutual might present. 
Additionally, the Shores should be allowed to complete discovery to determine if 
other theories need to be advanced in support of their counterclaims including reformation 
of contract, misrepresentation and fraud. 
The Shores should be granted their attorney's fees as consequential damages. 
Under Puzh v. North American. 1 P.3d 570, 2000 UT App 121, the Shores are 
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entitled to recover their attorney's fees as consequential damages for Liberty Mutual's 
conduct in this case. 
Burdene Shores requests that she recover her attorney's fees incurred because of 
Liberty Mutual's failure to properly handle her claim in this case. 
Dated: August 19, 2005 
<e^ 
Peter Whitmer 
Attorney for Burdene Shores 
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